Stop account takeover with two-factor authentication
An account protected by a password alone is one leaked password away from takeover. A second factor — a one-time code to the user's phone — stops the large majority of takeover attempts, and in India SMS is the factor that actually reaches everyone.
The problem, and the defence
Passwords leak — reused across sites, phished, dumped in a breach — and once one is known, an account is open. Account takeover is among the most common ways fraud starts, and a password on its own can't stop it. A second factor breaks the chain: even with the password, an attacker can't pass a code sent to the real user's phone.
You don't need it on every action — you need it at the right moments. Require a code at login from a new device, and as step-up the moment a user does something sensitive: a payment, a password change, adding a payee, changing a registered phone. That targets the friction at the risk, so trusted sessions stay smooth.
In India, the practical strength of a second factor is its reach. An SMS code needs no app, no token, no setup — just a phone, which every user has. That's why SMS remains the default second factor for consumer accounts, with an authenticator app offered alongside for users who want one.
The implementation is two API calls — send and verify — with the code generation, expiry, and attempt caps handled for you, and voice fallback so a failed SMS doesn't lock a user out. The 2FA product page covers the how; this is the case for doing it.
What you get
Codes at sign-in
Require a second factor from new or risky devices.
At the risky moment
Re-verify payments, payee changes, and resets.
No app required
SMS reaches every user — the widest factor in India.
Voice fallback
A failed SMS doesn't lock a real user out.
Caps and expiry
Short TTL and attempt limits blunt brute force.
Recorded attempts
Every send and verify logged for a security review.
Frequently asked
How much does 2FA actually reduce account takeover?
A second factor stops the large majority of takeover attempts, because an attacker with a stolen password still can't read a code on the real user's phone. We don't publish a single percentage for your context, but adding 2FA at login and on sensitive actions is among the highest-impact security changes most products can make.
Should I require a code on every login?
No — target it. Require a code from a new or unrecognised device, and as step-up the moment a user does something sensitive like a payment or a password change. That puts the friction where the risk is, so trusted sessions stay smooth and customers don't disable security out of annoyance.
Is SMS the right second factor, or should I use an app?
Offer both. SMS reaches everyone with a phone and needs no setup, so it's the default for consumer accounts in India; an authenticator app is stronger but assumes the user installs one. Most products lead with SMS and let security-conscious users add an app. The 2FA product page goes deeper on the trade-offs.
How hard is it to ship?
Two API calls — send and verify — with code generation, expiry, attempt caps, and voice fallback handled for you, and the code never stored on your side. See the OTP and 2FA pages for the implementation; this page is the case for prioritising it.